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Introduction
Restrictive business practices are a natural result of commercial enter-
prise. "They represent nothing more than the attempts of intelligent men to
interfere, to their own advantage, or that of the industry in which they are
engaged, with the free working of supply and demand and the results of
competition." 1 Such activities on the part of merchants and producers may
work unfairly against the interests of their competitors, the consuming
public, or society as a whole. To combat this, governments have intervened
to regulate and prevent such practices for almost as long as there has been
commerce itself.2 Curiously, however, restrictive business activities are
practiced on an international scale today, but no broadly effective legal
means of regulating them or preventing them has been established.
There has been a strong trend toward the liberalization of international
commerce through agreement among nations for the removal of
state-imposed barriers and restraints. Private barriers and restraints have
passed largely unscathed through this trend. This is not to intimate that
international restrictive business practices have been ignored. Over forty
years ago, there were proposals for a system of international controls.
Later, the projected charter for the post-World War 11 International Trade
Organization included provisions for the regulation of cartel activity and
other restraints. Time and events have not favored such attempts, how-
ever. Today the prospects of an international r6gime are not discussed so
often nor so optimistically as they once were, although to this author it
seems that conditions warrant its instigation more-not less-than ever.
A short historical review is offered here as a perspective on the waxing
and waning of efforts for an international system of controls over the last
*Sub-Director and Visiting Professor, Chile Law Program of the International Legal
Center; B.A., Grinnell College, 1962; J.D., Iowa, 1965.
'WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL AND ELLES, THE LAW OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
AND MONOPOLIES 2 (2d ed., 1966).2See, e.g., id., 17-31.
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four decades. This may demonstrate also that the problem is neither new
nor likely to go away as the world moves inexorably toward a full-blown
transnational economy. More recent literature has concentrated more on
the conflicts or extraterritorial aspects of national restrictive business prac-
tices legislation, in particular that of the United States. Although unde-
niably a complex and interesting field offering ample challenge, this may be
a short-sighted view which perpetuates improper mechanisms. This short
discussion will attempt to touch on current thought in official international
organizations (such as EFTA, the OECD, the GATT, the ECSC and
EEC, and the UNCTAD) which remains preoccupied with finding inter-
national answers to an international question. Hopefully, this article will
demonstrate why, along with the more specific objectives at issue and a
summary of how they might be served.
Historical Perspectives
League of Nations: First Recognition of the Problem
The first formal discussions of international controls for regulating re-
strictive business practices came after World War 1, in the League of
Nations. During the period between the two wars, the League published
innumerable reports and held frequent conferences, groping to explore and
understand the phenomenon of a "free, world market economy" which had
functioned before the first global conflict, but had apparently been a casu-
alty of the war. In 1939, looking back over the efforts of the League, its
Secretary-General stated:
When war broke out in 1914, there existed a system of economic organiza-
tion in the world which functioned smoothly and which it was generally
assumed would be re-established with necessary modifications once hostilities
ceased. It never was fully re-established, and since the depression which began
in 1929, there has been rather a state of quasi-permanent emergency than any
general operative system. The problems of economic organization that will
have to be faced after the termination of hostilities will therefore prove to be
extremely complex and grave. ...
Whatever the final outcome of the state of political tension may
be ... society will have to readapt itself sooner or later to a peacetime econo-
my, and a difficult period of adaption must be foreseen ... 3
One of the problems recognized, reported, and pondered in the League
of Nations Economic Committee was that of international cartels and
industrial agreements. In 1926, preparatory to the World Economic Con-
ference held in Geneva the following year under League auspices, William
Oualid published The Social Effects of International Industrial Agree-
3Quoted in Report to the Council on the Work of the Joint Session 10-1l
(C.52.M.52.1942.1 .A.).
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ments, The Protection of Workers and Consumers. On the basis of a
review of the national laws of all those countries "in which the problem is
at all acute," Oualid found substantial accord on the question of regulation
and supervision of cartels. He found no country, not even the United
States, which practiced flat prohibition of cartels and restrictive practices
per se.4
Reasoning from his findings, Oualid urged that the moment was
well-suited to the initiation of international regulations consistent with the
common views of the more important industrial nations. Specifically, he
proposed that the League of Nations work toward: (i) a multilateral con-
vention for the unification of national laws on restrictive business prac-
tices; (2) a requirement that all international industrial agreements in re-
straint of trade be reported to, and recorded in the League of Nations, with
a presumption of illegality attaching to any agreement not so filed; (3) the
creation of "national joint institutions," all attached to a single "inter-
national institution," to carry out investigation and enforcement; and (4)
the establishment of both national and international procedures and sanc-
tions against improper restrictive agreements. 5
First Divisions of Opinion: Geneva 1927
The Industrial Committee of the International Economic Conference
considered the question of establishing a system of international controls
on cartels as submitted by Oualid, but finally refused to recommend such
action on the grounds (1) that the diversities in national attitudes were too
great to admit the establishment of common norms, and (2) that many
states objected to an international regime as contrary to the principles of
national sovereignty and constitutional law.6 Instead, the Committee noted
that publicity could be one of the most effective means of "securing the
support of public opinion to agreements which conduce to the general
interest and, on the other hand, of preventing the growth of abuses." 7
Although it did not specify precisely how the requisite publicity was to be
generated, the Committee also suggested that any national tribunal might
take jurisdiction over international agreements "in so far as they involve
operations within the national territory." 8
It is not surprising that the original proposals for international controls
were effectively rejected in Geneva in 1927. Oualid's report was followed
'Oualid, The Social Effects of International Industrial Agreements 18-19 (C.E.C.P. 94.
1926).
51d., 35.
6 1nternational Economic Conference at Geneva, 1927, Final Report 44 (C.E.1.44.
1927.11.46).71d.81d.
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by numerous other reports and memoranda on the cartel question, all
published by the League as working documents for the World Economic
Conference. 9 The consensus of these publications was favorable to cartels
and industrial agreements, though usually with the reservation that they
were susceptible to improper excesses and abuse.10 Further, the concept of
"rationalization," which in the minds of most participating delegates appar-
ently mean greater concentration and specialization of industrial resources
for optimum efficiency, was thoroughly endorsed at the same conference.'1
Restrictive agreements were noted as a proper and desirable means to
rationalization.
1 2
Probably the most striking aspect of this first encounter with the subject
of international restrictive business practices, in formal discussion at the
international level, is that it framed the basic issues which have character-
ized debate on the matter ever since. The author was struck, in the re-
search and writing of this study, with the consistency of the argument
and its elements from inception to date. If this presentation does not fail
the material, the reader, too, should be impressed with the fact that little
progress has been made in this area in forty years, either by way of
introducing new perspectives or of actually doing anything about the prob-
lem.
Economic Depression: Cartels as a Redemptive Hope
The rigors of the Great Depression shifted governmental attitudes even
more radically in favor of cartel agreements. A study submitted to the
9These included Cassel, Recent Monopolistic Trends in Industry and Trade
(1927.11.36); Grossman, Methods of Economic Rapprochment (1926.11.69.); Hirsch, Nation-
al and International Monopolies from the Point of View of Workers, Consumers, and Ratio-
nlization (C.E.C.P.99.); Houston, Memorandum on Rationalization in the United States
(1927.11.3.); MacGregor, International Cartels (1927.11.16.); de Rousiers, Cartels and Trusts
and Their Development (1927.11.21.); Wiedenfeld, Cartels and Combines (1926.11.70.).
10The general tenor was perhaps best summarized in the Conference's Final Report,
which stated that cartels and restrictive agreements could "secure a more methodical organi-
zation of production and a reduction in costs by means of a better utilization of existing
equipment, the development on more suitable lines of a new plant, and a more rational
grouping of undertakings, and, on the other hand, act as a check on uneconomic competition
and reduce the evils resulting from fluctuations in industrial activity. By this means they may
assure to the workers greater stability of employment and at the same time, by reducing
production and distribution costs and consequently selling prices, bring advantages to the
consumer.... Nevertheless, the Conference considers ... that such agreements, if they en-
courage monopolistic tendencies and the application of unsound business methods, may check
technical progress in production and involve dangers to the legitimate interests of important
sections of society and of particular countries." International Economic Conference at Gen-
eva, 1927, Final Report 41 (C.E.l.44.1927.11.46.).
"Ibid., at 38-40, including several resolutions concerning the proper use and application
of rationalization; Journal of the International Economic Conference, May 4-27, 1927, pas-
sim.
2See, e.g., id., May 13, 1927, at 136-37 (summarized statements of Keto of Finland,
Lammers of Germany, Urban of Czechoslovakia); May 14, 1927, at 148 (summarized
statement of Hunt of Scientific Organization of Labor).
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League of Nations in 1930 by a committee of expert economists concluded
that a number of specific international cartels had each been wholly bene-
ficial in its economic, social and political effects. 13 By 1932 the League
was looking to cartels as one of the best true hopes for global economic
recovery.' 4 European governments not only encouraged but required in-
dustrial agreements between competing enterprises. Characteristic of the
period is the statement by the United Kingdom's Parlimentary Secretary of
the Department of Overseas Trade, in Dusseldorf in 1939, to lend official
support to negotiations for an anti-competitive agreement between British
and German industrial associations, "that the day of the individual trader is
over, that world markets should be divided and regulated by private agree-
ment and that an agreement like that contemplated with Germany should
be negotiated with other European countries.'
5
The United States and the War: Reversing World Opinion
The United States, after some early ambivalence toward government
controls and business combinations, decided not to follow the Europeans'
lead in fostering restrictive agreements as a means out of the Depression.
16
Under Thurman Arnold,' 7 and later Wendell Berge,' 8 the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Justice Department mounted an enthusiastic campaign of prose-
cutions and antitrust publicity beginning in the later 1930s. In 1938,P the
Congress appropriated over one million dollars for studies on the concen-
tration of economic power, funding the Temporary National Economic
Committee,' 9 as well as holding its own hearings.
20
laSt. Benni, et at., General Report on the Economic Aspects of International Industrial
Agreements (E.614.1930.11.41.). The authors of this report may have been less than totally
objective in its preparation. See Gunther, The Problems Involved in Regulating International
Restraints of Competition by Means of Public International Law, in II CARTEL AND MO-
NOPOLY IN MODERN LAW 579, 582 n. 6 (1961). A review and comparison of national
legislation on restrictive business practices was also submitted at this time. It noted the
possible abuses and the problems of satisfactory control over international combines and
agreements, but could offer no recommendation more constructive than that the problem was
extremely complex and should have been studied by a mixed group of lawyers and economists
to derive the best international policy in the area. DECUGIS, et. al., LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 17-18 (E.529(l). 1930.11.1 1.).14See Economic Committee, Report to the Council on the Work of the Thirty-Seventh
Session 3-4 (20.1.32.).
'
5Quoted in MASON, CONTROLLING WORLD TRADE 125 (1946).
16The definitive chronicle of the policy struggles on the way to the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration's final position on antitrust in HAWLEY; THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY (1966).
17See ARNOLD, BOTTLENECKS OF BuSINESS (1940). See also ARNOLD, FOLKLORE OF
CAPITALISM (1937).
18See BERGE, CARTELS: CHALLENGE TO A FREE WORLD (1944).
'
9See Final Report and Recommendations of the TNEC, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc.
No. 35 (1941).2 0Popularly known as the Bone, Truman and Kilgore Hearings, these were, respectively:
Committee on Patents, Hearings, Pts. 1-9, U.S. Sen., 77th Cong., 2d Sess., (1942); Special
Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Hearings, Pt. 2, U.S. Sen.,
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The ensuing investigations went into international as well as domestic
restraints of trade, and World War 11 provided a unique opportunity for
extensive discovery of business documents and other sources of informa-
tion on the operations of international cartels. Congressional hearings in
particular publicized the details of international agreements which had been
used to perpetrate abuses not only for economic gain, but for the political
and military objectives of Germany and Japan, and even Italy to a lesser
extent. The very word "cartel," originally an innocuous economic term,
became an epithet loaded with negative connotations. 21
Such disclosures reversed Depression thinking on the beneficent nature
of restrictive agreements and created in its place a preoccupation over
what should be done to curb cartels at the end of the war. It was neither
surprising nor atypical to find a distinguished American economist saying,
early in 1945, that
... if the United States feels deeply and is prepared to move boldly and with
conviction toward an international agreement outlawing cartels and restrictive
patent devices and contracts through which cartel results are frequently gained,
and toward a program for Germany which will remove that country as a source
of cartel infection and eliminate her cartels as devices for the revival and
perpetuation of German aggression, we have a fair chance to accomplish much
that we set out to do.
Bear in mind that the United States does not come to this problem hat in
hand, trembling, and as a suppliant. We are a powerful industrial and trading
nation. We have a very substantial stake in the post-war world, and we are in a
position, quite legitimately and without apology either to our neighbors or
posterity, to make that world what we would like it to be. In the matter of
cartels, at least, if we have convictions there is little excuse for subordinating
them at this stage of the game to the inclinations of any other nation or group
of nations in the world. We can move vigorously toward an international
agreement to compete...22
Post-War Efforts at International Controls: The ITO Charter
The United States had already given careful consideration to what its
post-war foreign policy would be. It had been clear for some time that the
American objective was a liberalized system of international commerce, as
free as possible from both state and private restraints. 23 A select, high-level
77th Cong., 1st Sess., (1941-42); Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs,
Hearings, U.S. Sen., 78th Cong., I Sess. (1943). Post-war literature on the operations and
effects of international cartels was voluminous. A fair sampling can be gained from, e.g.,
EDWARDS, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1944); MA-
SON, CONTROLLING WORLD TRADE (1946); STOCKING AND WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION
(1947).21See MASON, CONTROLLING WORLD TRADE 29-32, 96 n. I (1946).22Lewis, The Status of Cartels in Post-War Europe, in Edwards (ed.), A CARTEL POLICY
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 25, 45 (1945).23General expressions to this effect had been included in Point Four of the Atlantic
Charter in 1941, in the lend-lease agreement signed with Great Britian in 1942, in the 1943
amendments to the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, and in the Economic Charter of the
Americas drawn in Mexico City in 1945. The latter also contained a specific' anticartel
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committee had worked since 1943 to draft the general objective into a
comprehensive scheme published in 1945 as Proposals for Expansion of
World Trade and Employment, with Great Britian as co-sponsor.24 The
Proposals devoted a chapter to restrictive business practices, and included
other sections of employment, commodity agreements, state tariff and
non-tariff barriers to international trade, and an international organization
to coordinate and implement multilateral policies. The organization was to
be called the International Trade Organization (ITO). With the United
States' considerable prestige behind it, the ITO proposal was taken up at
the first meeting of the new United Nations Economic and Social Council
and a resolution was quickly adopted, calling for an international confer-
ence to discuss ratification of the plan. 25
Preparatory to the conference, the United States State Department
released a draft charter giving concrete form to the program laid out in the
Proposals.26 The draft contained an unabashed statement of the American
attitudes on restrictive business practices. Under the provisions of the draft
charter, any activities "which restrain competition, limit access to markets,
or foster monopolistic control in international trade" would have been
presumed violations. 27 More specifically, the following were listed as per se
violations wherever carried out by international combinations and/or agree-
ments:
2 s
(1) fixing prices or terms of sale,
(2) dividing markets or territories,
(3) limiting production or exports,
(4) suppressing technology or invention,
(5) boycott or discrimination against particular firms, or
(6) abusing copyright, trademark, or patent rights.
The United States' draft did not meet with unanimous approval. The
final conference on the proposed charter took place in Havana in 1948,
after preliminary meetings in London 29 and Geneva30 had raised and ham-
mered out some of the more basic problems.
provision. See Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace,
Mexico City, February 1945, at 95 (Dept. State, 1945).24 Dept. of State Pub. 2411, Commercial Policy Series 79 (1945).
25Resolution 1/13 of 18 February 1946, ECOSOC Official Records 173, 1st Year, 1st
Session (1946).2 6See Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the United Nations,
Dept. of State Pub. 2598, Commercial Policy Series 93 (1946) [hereinafter cited as US Draft].271d., art. 34(1).
28 1d., art. 34(2).
29See Preliminary Draft Charter for the International Trade Organization of the United
Nations, Dept. of State Pub. 2728, Commercial Policy Series 98 (1946).
3°See Draft Charter for the International Trade Organization of the United Nations,
Dept. of State Pub. 2927, Commercial Policy Series 106 (1947). The Geneva meeting actually
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Economic Policy and Sovereignty Problems
One of the first, most basic problems throughout the deliberations on the
ITO Charter was the fundamental difference in cartel policy manifested by
the participants. There was general agreement about the broadest premise,
that something should be done about abusive joint restraints on inter-
national commerce. But on the next most fundamental issue-whether
cartels were per se harmful-the participants split. The United States
maintained that restrictive business practices were inherently harmful to
commerce, production and employment. Less developed countries (impor-
ters of cartel-restrained goods) tended to support the United States views,
as did Canada. Delegates from the Benelux countries were equally insist-
ent that combinations and cartels functioned as one of the more useful and
effective means of intelligent economic planning, subject to abuses in a few
isolated instances, but on the whole benevolent in their effects. A substan-
tial bloc of other European countries, including Great Britian, tended to
agree more with the Benelux countries' argument. 31
The Benelux viewpoint clearly prevailed in the final draft, changing the
restrictive-practices chapter from an indictment of such activities to an
endorsement with reservations. The basic policy statement finally ap-
proved at Havana (and utilized in numerous other treaties and agreements
since) read:
Each member shall take appropriate measures and shall co-operate with the
Organization to prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enter-
prises, business practices affecting international trade which restrain com-
petition, limit access to markets, and foster monopolistic control, whenever
such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade
and interfere with the achievement of any of the other [basic objectives of the
Charter.]3 2
The six specific practices listed as presumed violations in the United
States draft were retained in the Havana Charter, not as per se violations,
but merely as prima facie justification for an ITO investigation after a
complaint from a state signatory to the Charter. 33
Another basic shift in approach involved protection of national sover-
eignty to an extent not contemplated by the United States' original draft.
Although the debates on this issue were not so obvious nor so clearcut as
worked with a "New York Draft," on which further revisions had been made in New York
following the London discussion. Id., 3.
31 For a summary of different countries' positions on this question, see, e.g., BROWN, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE 125-28 (1950); WILCOx, A
CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 105-07 (1949).
32 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, art. 46(I), Dept. of State Pub.
3117, Commercial Policy Series 113 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Havana Charter].
33Compare Havana Charter, art. 46(2,3) with U.S. Draft, art. 34(2).
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those over cartel policy, the ultimate changes were several, and run in a
single direction.
Where the United States draft of 1946 would have permitted complaints
to the ITO by Member States or private parties, the Havana Charter
provided for complaints only by Member States. 34 Member states were
encouraged to use the good offices of ITO for informal consultation when
they felt uncertain about the validity of a potential complaint, or wished to
utilize a less abrasive approach to a matter that might prove offensive to a
sister nation.35 Consultation was a compulsory first step when the activities
in question were those of a state trading enterprise36 and was the exclusive
remedy whenever "services" were involved. 37
A notoriously weak section of the chapter on restrictive business prac-
tices was the part dealing with sanctions. Member States were obligated to
"take full account" of all ITO decisions or requests, but only to the extent
of completing "the action it [the state] considers appropriate" in any given
case. 38 A Definitions article made it clear that an ITO "decision" could not
bind Member States, but only signified that the ITO "had reached a
conclusion."3 9
The United States draft would have bound ITO Member States to "take
action" against duly declared harmful restraints, but countries practicing
direct govermental control of cartels feared that such language might ren-
der ITO findings self-executing in their jurisdictions while the United
States, due to the role of the judiciary in its regulatory scheme, could have
fulfilled the same obligation by simply instituting an antitrust suit in which
the court was not bound to reach the same result as the ITO. Faced with
an extremely difficult and touchy problem, the drafters finally agreed that
any Member State would be obligated "to take all possible measures by
legislation or otherwise, in accordance with its constitution or system of
34Compare Havana Charter, art. 48(1) with U.S. Draft, art. 35(1,2). The complaint could
be lodged, however, by a state on behalf of an affected party over whom it had jurisdiction.
Havana Charter, art. 48(l).35See id., arts. 47, 51.361d., art. 48(l). This inclusion of state trading enterprises within the jurisdiction of the
ITO was in itself a broadening of the act, however. The US Draft had limited jurisdiction to
the activities of private commercial ventures. Compare Havana Charter, art. 46(1) with US
Draft, art. 34(l).37Havana Charter, art. 53. Services, defined as "transportation, telecommunications,
insurance and the commercial services of banks," had been included in the restrictive busi-
ness-practices section at the behest of India and other less developed countries. There was no
comparable article in the US Draft.
"
8Havana Charter, art. 50(2-5). Note that art. 50(3) further limited the state's obligation
by providing, "any Member, on notification to the Organization, may withhold information
which the Member considers is not essential to the Organization in conducting an adequate
investigation and which, if disclosed, would substantially damage the legitimate business
interests of a commercial enterprise."391d., art. 54(2.d).
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law or economic organization, to ensure" that no restrictive practices in
detriment of international commerce were carried out within their jurisdic-
tion. 40
ECOSOC Draft
All questions concerning the ITO Charter became moot in late 1950
when the entire document-signed by the representatives of over fifty
countries-died where it had been conceived, in the United States. The
State Department publicly withdrew its request for ratification and let the
matter drop. 41 Other nations, waiting for United States ratification before
committing themselves, did not attempt to revive the moribund issue. 42
However, the United States had not finished trying to establish a system
of regulation for international restraints on trade. As ITO and the Havana
Charter faded away, the State Department resurrected Chapter V as an
independent issue before the Economic and Social Council of the UN. 43 It
was there resolved that an ad hoc committee should formulate methods of
international cooperation and controls for the implementation of the sub-
stantive provisions of the Havana Charter relating to restrictive business
practices. 44
The ad hoc committee, instructed to proceed from the Havana Charter's
provision, did precisely that. The first eight articles of the draft which the
ad hoc committee submitted in 1953 were all but indistinguishable from the
first eight articles of the nine-article Restrictive Business Practices chapter
of the 1948 ITO Charter.45 Thus all of the provisions on substantive law,
40Compare Havana Charter, art. 50(1) with US Draft, art. 37(5).41The Charter had not been submitted to Congress until 1949, and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee had not opened hearings on it until 1950. Protectionist feelings against
ratification were apparent in much of the testimony and questions throughout the hearings.
See House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on H.J. Res. 236 "Membership and
Participation by the United States in the International Trade Organization," 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., (1950). Handicapped by its late start, the ITO Charter may also have suffered from an
unethusiastic effort even on the part of its strongest supporters, who may have felt that many
of their world free-trade objectives had been served by the institution of GATT and other
functioning programs. See Edwards, Regulation of Monopolistic Cartelization, 14 OHIO ST.
L.J. 252, 271 (1953).
42 Liberia was the only nation to ratify the Charter unconditionally. Sweden and Australia
agreed to ratification contingent upon favorable United States action. See House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, supra note 41 at 87.
43ECOSOC Document E/2030 of 22 June 1951.44ECOSOC Resolution 375 (XIII) of 13 September 1951. The ad hoc committee named
in the resolution included representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, India, Mexico,
Pakistan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. Id., para 3.
45Compare Havana Charter, arts. 46-53 with ECOSOC Document 2380, Annex 11,
Draft Articles of Agreement, arts. 1-8(1953) [hereinafter cited as ECOSOC Draft]. Further,
article 20 of the ECOSOC Draft was the same as article 54 of the Havana Charter. Only one
phrase was added to the substantive provisions, without any change in meaning. Compare
Havana Charter, art. 46(3.f) with ECOSOC Draft art. 1(3.f). Three other paragraphs were
added to the ECOSOC Draft, arts. 3(4), 5(7,8). One paragraph was dropped. Havana Charter,
art. 53(4).
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state obligations and general procedures were carried over intact into the
"new" proposal. The ECOSOC Draft was notable for the expeditious and
thorough procedures which it would have created for the implementation of
the articles it borrowed from the Havana Charter. 46
Ironically, the ECOSOC Draft, so faithful to the Havana Charter,
suffered the same fate: failure because the United States withdrew its
support at the crucial moment. After the change in administrations in 1953,
the State Department announced its decision not to support the proposal,
stating that efforts in the area could be directed more meaningfully toward
"achieving a greater degree of comparability in the policies of all nations in
their approach to the subject." '47 Several other nations had filed statements
favorable to the ECOSOC Draft and its accompanying report, urging
adoption, but did not push the matter when the United States came out en
contra.48
Final disposition of the matter in ECOSOC was a simple declaration of
continuing concern over restrictive business practices' potential for harm
to international trade efforts, coupled with an expression of support for
further study and legislation in the area on the national and regional level.
The UN Secretary-General was instructed to keep gathering data for the
purpose of suggesting further action on the subject at a "later session."'49
The GATT
One of the key questions posed but unanswered by the ad hoc com-
mittee on the ECOSOC was as to which existing international organization
could best have administered the proposed scheme of cartel regulation.
The two bodies specifically mentioned were the UN and the Contracting
Parties to the GATT, with responsibility for the final recommendation
delegated to the Secretary-General of the UN. When the latter found it
impossible to submit his reasoned recommendation by the agreed-upon
date, 50 several of the Contracting Parties availed themselves of the 1954
(Ninth Session) discussions on revisions of the GATT to propose that a
section on control of trade restraints should be included in the new agree-
ment. 51
46See ECOSOC Draft, arts. 9-17. A complete discussion of the reasoning behind these
articles and a description of the way they should have worked in practice is found in
ECOSOC Document 2380 at 8-20 (1953).47ECOSOC Document E/2612, Add. 2 at 5 (1955).4 Those nations on the record as in favor of the proposal included France, Turkey,
Pakistan, Norway, and Germany. The Council of Europe and the International Cooperative
Alliance had likewise expressed their official support. Those who filed adverse comments, in
addition to the United States, were the Union of South Africa, the International Chamber of
Commerce, and the United States Chamber of Commerce. See EDWARDS, CONTROL OF
CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES 234-35 (1967).
49ECOSOC Resolution 568 (XIX) of 26 May 1955.
5
°See YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 337 (1953).51The issue of sovereignty was again fundamental to the discussion. A joint proposal by
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GATT approached the problem carefully, postponing the matter until
ECOSOC had finished with it, 52 then creating an intersessional committee
to recommend whether any action at all was advisable. 53 Consequent upon
a favorable report adopted in 1958, 5 4 a second group of experts was
appointed to study the problem and recommend what precisely was the
approach feasible within the structure of GATT.55
The GA TT Solution: Voluntary Independent Consultation Between Sover-
eign States
After some initial struggling to accomodate a problem not anticipated by
the creators of the GATT mechanism, 56 the expert study group reached
substantial agreement on a relatively timid solution. The group felt that
Contracting Parties should consult privately on the harmful effects of any
restrictive business practices to which they were a party or their residents
were a party. After termination of discussion, the consulting nations should
submit to the GATT Secretariat a report on the negotiations and the
results reached. A standing group of experts would then evaluate the
report, at the same time that it was conducting general inquiries into the
effects of restraints upon international commerce and national devel-
opment. The standing group was expected, at any propitious time, to
recommend whatever further action GATT should take on the general
question. Four countries-Norway, Sweden, Denmark and France-would
Norway, Sweden and Denmark straightforwardly urged the ECOSOC Draft on the GAIT
Contracting Parties. GATT Document L/283 (1954). This proposal did include some minor
changes in the draft then before ECOSOC, but so minimal as to be of no consequence'. West
Germany, however, took a new tack. While it was amenable to the substantive provisions on
restrictive business practices, the German proposal would have eliminated the possibility of a
direct complaint to the international body, requiring consultation between involved nations as
the preliminary step in all cases. Only when the conciliatory procedure failed to satisfy the
Contracting Parties concerned would the issue have been proper for consideration before the
plenary session. The ultimate action in such case would have been a non-binding recommen-
dation, reached by majority vote. See GATT Document L/261, Add. I at 41 ff. (1954).52GATT, 3rd Supp. BISD 239 (1955); SeeGATT Documents L/551, L/568 (1955).53The intersessional committee asked the GATT Secretariat for a de novo analysis of the
whole question of restrictive business practices and their regulation. A memorandum was
prepared and afterwards printed for sale to the public as GATT, Restrictive Business Prac-
tices, GATT/1959-2 (1959).54GATT Resolution of 5 Nov. 1958, 7th Supp. BISD 29 (1959).
551d.
56The basic problem is fully developed in JACKSON, WORLD MARKETPLACE LAW: GATT
AND THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE § 20.3 notes 14-17 and
accompanying text (to be published). Essentially, the question was one of how to adapt
mechanisms created to control government actions to the task of controlling the activities of
private enterprise. The language of article XXIII of the General Agreement, while it appeared
at first glance to be appropriate, was not truly applicable. Nor was article XXV, for the same
reason. All proposals for anything beyond mere consultation ran into the same insuperable
obstacle: the nature of the institution. See GATT Document L/1301 at 7-8 (1960).
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have expanded the powers of the permanent group of experts to include
direct participation in all consultations between nations, but that proposal
failed to gain the approval of a majority of the countries drafting the GATT
plan. 57
The Contracting Parties quickly adopted the proposal when it came
before them in 1959, but not without paring away most of its potential
impact. They acted through a formal "decision" that GATT member states
should submit reports on all consultations after the fact.5 8 The preamble to
the official act recommended the consultation procedure to the Contracting
Parties but in no way attempted to make it mandatory. 59 The erstwhile
standing group of experts was not mentioned, either in the text of the
decision or elsewhere.
Summary
With the decision of the Contracting Parties in 1960, the post-war effort
to institute comprehensive international cartel controls came to rest, clear-
ly evolved out of the United States' sweeping proposals of fourteen years
before, but scarcely recognizable:and withered almost away. Where the
original project of 1946 had been supranational in character, proposing per
se violations and providing for private complaints to a central investigating
agency, the GATT measure did no more than proffer the mild suggestion
that sovereign nations should consult on the best manner of avoiding the
harmful effects of international business restraints, whenever a nation was
moved by the effects of such restraints to initiate negotiations with another.
Current Discussion of the Problem
The issue of international restrictive business practices and what to do
about them is still very much alive in 1970. Both the OECD and the
Council of Europe have recently devoted fresh consideration to the prob-
lem, and still have it under advisement. On a more limited regional scale,
the EEC rules on competition are a well-known fact of business life, a
supranational control regime. The European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) has also taken a regional approach to the problem, though from
57See the committee's final report, including both majority and minority views. GATT,
9th Supp. BISD 170 (1961).58GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 28 (1961).
591d. To date no reports on such negotiations have been submitted to the GATT
Secretariat. See EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES 238 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as CONTROL]; Markert, Recent Developments in International Antitrust Cooperation,
XIII ANTITRUST BULL. 355, 356 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Markert]. Unreported informal
consultations between nations do occur, however; apparently with some frequency. See e.g.,
EFTA Bulletin for December, 1968, at 9; Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly,
Hearing, International Aspects ofAntitrust, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 68, 205 (1967).
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the international (as opposed to supranational) view. The Central Ameri-
can Common Market (CACM) Treaty contains provisions which could be
invoked against restraints. 60 UNCTAD is currently conducting studies "of
restrictive business practices adopted by private enterprises of developed
countries, with special reference to the effects of such practices on the
export interests of the developing countries, especially on the least devel-
oped." 61
Perhaps the longevity of the debate and its currency are the best in-
dications that the considerations which sparked the original discussions
remain 'as valid today as they appeared at the height of the postwar
paranoia against cartels, or even more so. 6 2
OECD A ction
The OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices,
whose best-known contribution has been the simple collection and com-
parison of the relevant legislation in the various western industrialized
nations, 6 3 has also worked since 1963 studying the concrete effects of
existing international cartels and the possibility of instigating cooperation
among OECD members on the issue.
In early October, 1967, the OECD Council issued a recommendation to
Member States recognizing the possible "adverse effects [of international
restraints on commerce] on achievement of trade-expansion and econom-
ic-growth aims of Member countries as set out in Article I of the Con-
vention" and the need for "closer cooperation between Member Countries
in this field." '6 4 To those ends, the Council specifically recommended that:
(I) Member Countries notify and inform each other in advance when
undertaking "an investigation or a proceeding involving important interests
of another; '65 (2) where two or more Member Countries simultaneously
proceed against an international trade restraint, "they should endeavor to
coordinate this action in so far as appropriate and practicable under nation-
60General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, arts. XI and XIII (signed
at Managua, Nicaragua, 13 December 1960).61UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Practices, UN Doc. TD/B/C.2/54 (2 October 1968)
at I. 62See, e.g., Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Hearings, International
Aspects ofAntitrust, Pt. I, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) passim; Markert, 356-59; CONTROL
321-23.
3The OECD maintains a five-volume looseleaf service called Guide to Legislation on
Restrictive Business Practices, which includes section on the EEC and ECSC laws. The
OECD also published a 17-point comparison of existing national legislation, Restrictive
Business Practices: Comparative Summary of Legislations [sic] in Europe and North Amer-
ica (1964).64 OECD Document C(67)53 Final of 10 October 1967, reprinted in Markert, 370-72.
611d., para. l(a).
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al laws;" 66 (3) Member Countries should tender general information to
each other and "cooperate in developing or applying mutually beneficial
methods of dealing with restrictive business practices in international
trade."6 7
OECD and GA TT Actions Compared
The OECD's recommendation is modest in its demands on the Member
Countries, as was the GATT decision. It is manifestly clear that all
cooperation in both should be "on a fully voluntary basis."'6 8 The primary
aim of the OECD's measure in fact may be no more ambitious than
formally to endorse a method now employed on an informal basis between
the United States and Canada and some other countries, with a degree of
apparent success in soothing sovereign egos at the same time as it controls
harmful restraints. 69
The OECD Council's recommendation does not, of course, have any
substantive provisions that the GATT decision did not. The former is
somewhat more specific in setting out what the consultation procedure
shall consist of, but it does not request nations to report to the body at
large on the circumstances and results in 'each negotiation. The OECD
continues to keep the topic of substantive provisions under active study.
Council of Europe Efforts: The Reciprocity Approach to Conflicts
The nineteen-member 70 Council of Europe has shown a continuing inter-
est in the problem of regulation of international restrictive business prac-
tices. Its activities in the field date from 1949, when it proposed an
agreement which would have created an independent, supranational agency
for the regulation of cartels in most of Europe. That plan, very similar in
procedure to the present scheme for the enforcement of the European
Convention on Human Rights, proved too radical. 71 It was finally aban-
doned in 1958.72
66 1d., para. I(b).67 1d., para. 3.
681d., introduction.69 See Vernon, Antitrust and International Business, HARV. Bus. REV. 78, 86-87 (Sept.
Oct., 1968); and authority cited for the second part of note 56 supra.70The Council of Europe now includes representatives of all EEC and the seven original
EFTA Member States plus Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta and Turkey.
7See Memorandum on the Recommendation of the Consultative Assembly for the
Preparation of a European Convention for the Control of International Cartels and Draft
Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, SG/R (5 1) 15, 28 Nov. 1951. See also discussion in
Wiebringhaus, Le Droit des Ententes dans le Cadre de la C.E.E. et de I'E.F.T.A.,REV. DE
MARCH- COMMUN 755, 756 (Oct., 1966) [hereinafter cited as Wiebringhausl; Markert, 364.72See Focsaneanu, Les Practiques Commerciales Restrictives et le Droit International,
ANNUAIRE FRANCAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 266, 286-88 (1964).
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In 1965 the Council of Europe took up a simpler, but no less con-
troversial proposal aimed at resolving the conflict between national sover-
eignty and extra-territorial enforcement of municipal decisions concerning
international restrictive practices. 73 The proposal was made in the form of
a report submitted to the Legal Committee of the Consultative Assembly.
74
The report observed a "manifest contradiction ... between two generally
accepted principles: objective exercise of territorial jurisdiction and refusal
of its extraterritorial coercive consequences. ' 75 It suggested that the dis-
crepancy might be resolved by means of a reciprocity convention which
would have bound all signatory parties to enforce the subpoenas, in-
junctions and other court orders issuing from the municipal courts of any
other signatory party in a valid suit against a restrictive business practice.
This approach was rationalized in terms of the "legitimate tendency of all
industrial states to defend their economy, through appropriate legislative
dispositions and regulations, against business practices which restrict com-
petition and, more generally, distort normal market conditions."
76
Coming at a time when the EFTA and the OECD were both discussing
solutions more in keeping with the generally accepted legal theory and the
vindication of national territorihl sovereignty, the Council of Europe report
encountered strenuous objections. In the first place, it asked states to
honor precisely the extra-territorial reach which many had so resisted
when it was attempted unilaterally by the United States. 77 In matters of
restrictive business practices, all other nations have remained faithful to
what one scholar calls "that distribution of state jurisdiction and to that
idea of international forbearance without which the present international
order cannot continue," 78 and have not attempted extraterritorial enforce-
73See Consultative Assembly Document 1997 of 22 Nov. 196 .74The report, prepared by the Frenchman M. de Grailly, is printed as Consultative
Assembly Document 2023 of 25 January 1966. The best concise,. yet comprehensive dis-
cussion of it is in Wiebringhaus.
"Consultative Assembly Document 2023 of 25 January 1966, para. 26. The report
argued that general principles of Private International Law recognized the right of municipal
courts to exercise trial and decisional jurisdiction over matters taking place or producing a
direct effect within the national territory of the court in question. Id., para 20-22. The obvious
problem was the countervailing Private International Law Doctrine which, beyond the limits
of comity and good will, did not command foreign courts to enforce coercive orders issued to
implement the fact-finding process or the decision originating in the original municipal court,
thus rendering the judgment of that court practically nugatory in many cases involving
international commercial enterprises. See Id., para. 23-25.
76Wiebringhaus at 757.
77See BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 45-51 (1958), Jen-
nings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, XXXIII BRITISH
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (1957); Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in
International Law, III REC. DE COURS 9, 100-09, 150,53 (1964); Oliver; The Range of the
Effect of the Antitrust Laws of the United States, Rep. of 5 Ist Conf. of the Int'l Law Ass'n
511 (1964).
78Mann supra, note 77 at 149.
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ment of their laws. 79 In fact, other countries have refused to enforce
judgements of the United States in antitrust cases against aliens80 and have
passed laws expressly prohibiting compliance with discovery proceedings
under the United States antitrust laws.8x
It is hard to imagine how the adoption of the proposed reciprocity
convention could have avoided aggravating precisely the problem area
which the GATT and OECD measures were at such pains to leave un-
riled: the whole question of national sovereignty and existing rules of
jurisdiction in International Law. At least in the area of international
restrictive business practices, which would involve extensive discovery of
business records in other countries as well as enforcement of court orders
against practices which may have been acceptable or even encouraged by
the host country, the potential consequences are so incredible that one
wonders if the idea or a reciprocity convention is posed in complete
seriousness. 8 2
Secondly, as described below, both the EEC and EFTA treaties include
provisions dealing with restraints on commerce between their respective
member states. Thus the convention might have conflicted not only with
international law practice and doctrine generally, but with existing sys-
tems within the specific membership of the Council of Europe. E.g., which
rule prevails as between two EEC states? As between two EFTA states?
Between an EFTA state and an EEC state? Between a state which is a
member of neither EFTA nor the EEC and a member state of either
organization?
Thirdly, while reciprocity conventions are an acknowledged and useful
means of resolving conflicts in many areas of the civil law, the proposal of
such a convention in the public area of restrictive business practices seems
particularly inappropriate.83 If countries cannot agree to-an international
791n most cases and until more recently, this had been a simple enough matter since other
countries had no such laws to enforce.8
°Most notably in British Nylon Spinners v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. [1953]
Ch. 19 (C.A. 1952).81See Mann supra, note 77 at 154 n. 109. Ratification of the new Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 594 (1969):
8 Int'l Leg. Materials 37 (1969), would probably not change the existing prohibitions, since
that document applies only to "civil and commercial matters" (art. I), and no evidence
"incompatible with the internal law of the State of Execution" will be required (art. 9.2). See
Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A.J. 651, 654,
655 (1969).82Essentially the same plan had been proposed before, however, by Plaisant in 1954 in an
unpublished Report to the Fourth Comparative Law Congress. This plan is criticized in W.
Friedmann & van Thematt, International Cartels and Combines, in ANTITRUST LAWS 469,
485-86 (W. Friedmann, ed.) (1956). The Council of Europe report is discussed at some length
in the already-cited articles by Markert and Wiebringhaus.
83See Jennings, supra, note 77; Friedmann & van Thematt, supra.
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r6gime of controls because of basic differences in philosophy, how can they
be expected to enforce the "political notions" '8 4 of other countries? Or,
conversely, if their internal rules are substantially in accord, why not
establish an international regime?
The Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly finally decided that the
Legal Committee should continue studying the problem and present its
"final" conclusions "in due course." 8 5
The EEC: Supranational Rules of Competition
The most effective controls on international restrictive business prac-
tices are those in the European Economic Communities. The system em-
ployed there is a topic of such wide-spread interest and so many existing
publications have already treated it at length, that little exposition is neces-
sary here. Suffice it to say that it imposes a supranational regime directly
applicable to legal and natural individuals resident within the Member
States.8 6 The EEC legislation creates a new scheme of prohibitions, subject
to exception in certain circumstances. In implementation of its substantive
articles, it includes provisions for registration of restrictive agreements,8 7
and vests powers of investigation, decision and sanction in the EEC Com-
mission.
The drafters of the Rome Treaty apparently adopted a policy of com-
petition because they were impressed with the performance of the United
States' competitive economy, and because the dimensions of the
six-country Common Market made such a policy more salable than it might
have been in any single state other than West Germany.
The EFTA: Effective Consultation
The approach of the European Free Trade Association is much closer to
that of GATT and the OECD, although it is more nearly complete in its
84Application of this term to antitrust laws is from Jennings, supra, note 77, at 175.
"'Consultative Assembly Directive No. 247 of 27 January 1966. The matter apparently
is still under active study in the Council of Europe, but has not advanced to the committee
stage. Krfiger, The Council of Europe and Unification of Private Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L.
127, 148 (1968).86See EEC Treaty, arts. 85-90; Council Reg. No. 17/62, as amended by Council Reg.
No. 59/62; Council Reg. No. 19/65; Council Reg. No. 27/62; Council Reg. No. 153/62;
Council Reg. No. 67/67/ All in STEIN & HAY, DOCUMENTS FOR LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 1967.87Notifications of agreements to the EEC Commission have run high. Edwards reports
that about 37,500 restrictive agreements were registered by 31 March 1965 and many more
existed but were not reported. CONTROL at 292-93. However, MacLachlan & Swann, state
that 38,154 agreements had been notified to the Commission twelve months earlier, on 31
March 1964. COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 142 (1967).
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provisions. 88 Article 15 of the Stockholm Convention provides that restric-
tive business practices or dominant enterprises are improper "in so far as
they frustrate the benefits expected from the removal or absence of duties
and quantitative restrictions on trade between Member States."'89 Enforce-
ment is to be carried out under the procedure of article 3 1 of the EFTA
Convention, which-as in the case of corresponding articles in
GATT 9 0-was set up to deal with barriers created or imposed by direct
state, not private, action. The drafters of the Stockholm Convention fore-
saw that the restrictive trade practices article might be a special problem,
however, and provided for Council consideration of "further or different"
provisions for dealing with the issue, beginning no later than December,
1964.91 The Council's first formal action under this enabling provision was
the Copenhagen Agreement promulgated in October, 1965.92
The Copenhagen Agreement did not change the article 31 procedure,
but did make an effort to clarify the manner in which it should apply to the
special exigencies of dealing with restraints of trade. As outlined in the
Agreement, any Member State may initiate consultation with another on
the simple complaint of a private firm or the prima facie showing of a
possible infringement of article 15. Other Member States are bound to help
in the investigation of the complaint to the extent that their respective
"legislation and practices will allow." All consultations are to be informal
and confidential, with due care "not to disclose business secrets." In the
event of failure to reach agreement through negotiation, 93 recourse to the
formal complaint procedure before the EFTA Council is available. The
Council is empowered to investigate and issue a recommendation. When
the recommendation is not complied with, the Council's only sanction is
the authorization of retaliatory measures by others against the recalcitrant
Member.
88See generally European Free Trade Ass'n, Building EFTA 100, 106-1I (1966); Gam-
melgard, The Regulation of Private Restraints on Competition in the Convention of the
EFTA and its Significance, in I CARTEL AND MONOPOLY IN MODERN LAW 151 (196 1).
8Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association (signed at Stockholm,
20 Nov. 1959). 370 UNTS 5 (1960).
9 0See note 56 supra.
91EFTA Convention, art. 15(3.a).92The Copenhagen Agreement was reprinted in the EFTA Bulletin for November, 1965.
A good, official exposition of the Agreement in Restrictive Business Practices: The Copen-
hagen Agreement Explained, EFTA BULL. 4 (July, 1967); Progress on Restrictive Business
Practices, ETA BULL. 8 (Dec. 1968).931f Member States are successful in reaching an accord through their negotiations, they
must still coerce the private parties involved into honoring the resolution. Often no legal
remedy would be possible against the firms or individuals involved; they would have to resort
to administrative measures. However, planned legislation for both England and Portugal
would create direct means for applying the decisions of the EFTA Council under article 15.
Id., 8.
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So that a body of experience in the area may be collected, general
reports are to be submitted to the EFTA Secretariat after each inter-state
discussion, including the points of consideration and the final action tak-
en. 94 The effectiveness of the EFTA system is under continuing review by
a special committee, raising the possibility of more radical changes in the
future. 95
Synthesis of Past Experience And Current Efforts
The above discussion, though relatively lengthy, by no means exhausts
the material. 96 Only the more important proposals and measures have been
treated in this study, for the purpose of illustrating the three basic trends in
the area of international controls on restrictive business practices:
(1) The supranational system of control through a central agency em-
powered to operate directly on individuals, established in the European
Community by the ECSC Treaty of 1951 and the EEC Treaty of 1957;
(2) Non-binding consultation between sovereign states, officially
adopted in varying forms by the Contracting Parties to GATT, the OECD
and the EFTA, and practiced unofficially by the United States and several
other nations;
(3) Regulation through a reciprocity agreement binding the states party
to it to enforce the valid orders of other parties' municipal courts in
application of national restrictive business practices legislation, as pro-
posed before the Council of Europe.
The Case For International Controls On
International Restrictive Business Practices
International Trade is Bigger than National Sovereignty
It does not require exceptional acumen or a bold spirit to venture the
opinion that world commerce in 1969 moves to its own global rhythm,
somewhat inconvenienced by national controls perhaps, but essentially
undaunted. Trade today is no respecter of the nation state, save insofar as
it must conduct itself as a well-behaved resident in return for the right to do
business within a given state. On the other hand, political boundaries just
94Some four cases of bilateral consultation have occurred thus far. In two, the practice in
question was curtailed shortly after negotiations began. In another, the issue became moot
when one of the private parties involved dropped his claim. In the last case, negotiations were
carried through to an agreement that article 15 was being infringed. The authorities of the
country directly involved pointed this out to the private party imposing the restraint and it was
discontinued. Id., 9.95
td.
96The most comprehensive review is probably found in Focsaneanu, supra, note 72.
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as often provide the means of avoiding the surveillance, imposts or sanc-
tions of outside authority. As long ago as 1947 Sigmund Timberg charac-
terized the new challenge and its impact:
It has become apparent that the obligations and duties which are generated
by international combines and similar business associations are on an economic
plane different from, and frequently contradictory to, the political loyalties and
allegiances implicit in the concepts of nationality or citizenship.' The law,
however, is still in the difficult process of being weaned away from the proposi-
tion that these international entities are nationals of some state or other, or that
their "citizenship" has other than purely domiciliary implications.
These shortcomings of international law are but reflections of the disparity
between the territorially fragmented nature of legal systems and the integrated
nature of business organizations and economic practice. Bussinessmen have
recognized (or at least have institutionalized without recognizing) the inter-
national interdependence of economic life and have, accordingly, developed
international frames of organization for international economic activity. (Law-
yers, on the other hand, have adhered to rigidly compartmentalized national
legal systems, which are unable to cope with an economic order of inter-
national dimensions.) 97
The phenomena remarked by Timberg have not gone unremarked by
other lawyers in the years since. The period since 1947 has rather seen the
growth of a new area of the law, which might be labeled "International
Economic Law." 98 The commercial impetus to this legal interest has been
described by a number of writers, most recently by Professor Raymond
Vernon in a trio of articles on the unabated trend toward "inter-
nationalization" of business enterprise.99 Vernon notes the current tenden-
cy of all relatively large United States companies (rather than only the
select few) to engage in international ventures from which a substantial
portion of total income may be derived: "a figure of one fourth or one fifth
is fairly common." 10 0 Companies no longer regard their foreign operations
as a separate, vertically-organized division but as another component of
their integral, horizontally-structured program. 10 '
97Timberg, International Combines and National Sovereigns, 95 PENN. L. REV. 575,
576-77 (1947). See David, The Methods of Unification, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 13 (1968).
98 For example, the Hague Lectures in recent years have included a number of presenta-
tions concerned with this new area of international law. See Feliciano, Legal Problems of
Private International Business Enterprises, 118 REC. DE COURs 213 (1966); Schwarzen-
berger, The Principles and Standards of International Economiic Law, 117 REC. DE COURs 5
(1966); van Hecke, Le Droit Antitrust: Aspects Comparatif et Internationaux, 106 REC. DE
COURs 253 (1962); Hyde, Economic Development Agreements, 105 REC. DE COURs 271
(1962); Sereni, International Economic Institutions and the Municipal Law of States, 96 REC.
DE CouRs 133 (1959); Ropke, Economic Order and International Law, 86 REC. DE CoURs
207 (1954).
9 Antitrust and International Business, HARV. Bus. REV. 78, (Sept.-Oct., 1968); Eco-
nomic Sovereignty at Bay, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 110 (Oct., 1968); The Role of U.S. Enter-
prise Abroad, DAEDALUS 113 (Winter, 1969).
1'0 The Role of U.S. Enterprise Abroad, supra, note 99 at 113, 116.
0'0 Antitrust and International Business, supra note 99 at 78, 83.
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Everyone who reads the news media knows that "American" firms have
utilized their capital to purchase control of large sectors of the European
economy at the same time that they have continued to expand their in-
vestments in new enterprises all over the free world. By the same token,
business capital that could be called "Japanese," "German," "Italian" or
any of several other nations', ranges worldwide in search of investment
opportunities.
Though it hardly needs repeating in the jet age, the world is shrinking.
Communications and transport effectiveness have radically increased the
potential for world trade over what it was a generation ago. Interaction
between the components of the commercial milieu is correspondingly high.
Such international expansion may create market power which is capable of
abuse. Where there are competitors there may be fewer of them and the
communications better between them, thus the restrictive arrangements
easier to negotiate and enforce. Even the patent laws and certain promo-
tional incentives offered by less developed countries to lure foreign capital
may also be turned to anti-competitive purposes by private international
enterprise.
Current efforts to liberalize international commerce and foment econom-
ic integration may be both a cause and an effect of the existing situation.
With the notable exception of the European Community's supranational
politico-economic approach, efforts are usually directed at negotiations
between national governments for the removal of national govern-
ment-imposed barriers to free trade.
This sort of economic integration is hardly infallible. 10 2 The component
parts of international trade and industry do not make a neat bundle. They
are rather a congeries of disperse elements and considerations which seem
to pop out unhindered by the efforts of nations to wrap them up in a
coordinated consistent policy package. In many cases, such as tariffs and
currency exchange, nations seem to evolve new compensatory mechanisms
to reinstate the same effects as fast as they concede them away within
structures such as GATT or the IMF (e.g., tariffs are replaced with border
taxes or ad valorem "dues" paid to import associations). Bilateral treaties,
such as in the tax field, may attempt more effective coordination of pol-
icies, but a third-party nation may at least partially negate the desired effect
by providing a tax haven.
Wholly apart from the foibles of governments, private enterprise may
102Even the EEC is experiencing the problems caused by recalcitrant national govern-
ments. The French have admitted Algerian meal imports duty-free, in apparent contravention
of the EEC Treaty. The French courts have upheld the national law. There is virtually no way
to enforce Common-Market law that would not jeopardize the entire EEC structure. See
CCH Common Market Reports 8513, para. 9245 (1968).
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counter efforts at economic integration through countervailing agreements.
International cartels still function vigorously, "characterized by division of
markets, production and sales quotas, agreements as to prices and condi-
tions of delivery, and common uses of patents, to name only the most
important devices."103 The staggering number of registrations in the EEC
Commission testifies to the high incidence of international restrictive agree-
ments today. 104
As Professor Vernon observed, "enterprises that are global in scope do
seem to deserve a regime in which they are responsible to authorities
whose scope is just as broad." 105 Nonetheless, it is probably a fair assess-
ment that to date no legal mecahnisms have evolved which are capable of
operating satisfactorily within the same broad spheres of influence in which
private international economic interests have functioned so competently
for so long.
New National Legislation
Perhaps one of the best indicia of world-wide popular sentiment for
regulation of restrictive business practices is the continuing vigorous legis-
lative activity in the field by national legislatures. The "burst of post-war
national legislation"106 continues unabated. Professor Corwin Edwards
lists thirteen industrial countries of western Europe which, within the last
fifteen years, have either passed new legislation curbing restrictive business
practices and their harmful effects or have passed amendments strength-
ening existing legislation.10 7 He points out that virtually all of the
non-communist modern industrial states now have such legislation and that
only Japan, in mitigation of the strict provisions imposed by occupation
legislation, has shown a tendency to weaken her regulatory scheme. All
other countries have tended to move in the direction of more and stricter
controls.108
1 03Fulda, Book Review, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 285 (1968). Further, the United States
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has recently begun prosecution of an inter-
national quinine and quinidine cartel, involving three domestic and twelve foreign firms. See
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, 28 October 1968, p. 2.
' 
4 ee note 85 supra.
105Vernon, The Role of U.S. Enterprise Abroad, DAEDALUS 113, 132 (Winter, 1969).106The phrase is Edwards'. CONTROL, Title to Chapter 1.07The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. See CON-
TROL, 337-68. Two other countries, Italy and Luxembourg, are also bound to the articles of
the EEC Treaty regulating restrictive business practices, although neither state has municipal
legislation in the field yet. Edwards goes more deeply into the national legislation and practice
of individual countries in another recent book, TRADE REGULATION OVERSEAS (1966)
08CONTROL, Chapter I. Apart from the European nations, the United States, Canada,
Japan, South Africa, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and New Zealand have such laws.
Other countries continue to consider their enactment. See Fulda & Till, An Antitrust Policy
for India, XIII ANTITRUST BULL. 373 (1968).
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These recent developments may mean that one of the strongest criti-
cisms leveled against early efforts at international controls in this field is no
longer valid. The U.S. State Department's major criticism of the ECOSOC
Draft of 1953 was that the "substantial differences which exist in national
policies and practices" were of "such magnitude that the proposed inter-
national agreement would be neither satisfactory nor effective."' 1 9 Today
United States officials might put less stock in such an analysis.' 10
There have been two more commonly recognized schools of thought in
the various national approaches to restrictive business practices, with the
United States and Canada on one side of the issue and the European states
on the other. The dichotomy is usually drawn on the basis of how a
country feels about the basic acceptability of restrictive business practices
and dominant market position. The United States is often characterized as
pursuing a prohibitive policy toward most trade restraints and monopoliza-
tion per se, while western Europe is supposedly tolerant of the forms so
long as they do not lead in fact to abuses and harmful effects.
Not all commentators see such a gulf between the two attitudes today.
Professor Edwards, perhaps the most widely experienced scholar in the
field of comparative antitrust legislation, has observed: "One conclusion
emerges clearly-that the foreign laws are not uniformly more permissive
toward restriction than the American law."'' Edwards finds that the
United States exercises strictest control against horizontal arrangements
(common price levels, division of markets, production quotas, uniform
terms of sale and discount, etc.), while European laws tend to concentrate
more on the regulation of vertical restraints (refusal to sell, resale price
maintenance, etc.). Where such practices as boycott, blacklisting, and other
methods of discrimination against competitors or consumers are involved
both the United States and the Europeans usually will prohibit the re-
straint." 2
Any comparison of the laws of so many nations must be suspect for the
mere fact that it must proceed at such a general level to cover the
ground. 1 3 Acknowledging the somewhat artificial nature of the endeavor,
however, the author still feels that it may be worthwhile in the present
context, given that the argument is already met on those dangerously broad
grounds. Undertaking the analysis at the most general level, then, perhaps
09Quoted in Montague, The Proposed UN Program on Restrictive Business Practices,
in University of Michigan Summer Institute on International and Comparative Law, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 485, 496 (1957).110See Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Hearings, International As-
pects ofAntitrast, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. I, at 16-17, 304, 495 (1966).
... CONTROL, 202.1121d., 202-08.
113As Edwards is the first to acknowledge. Id., 202.
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the discrepancies in municipal legislation can be explained in a way mean-
ingful for international efforts at control of restrictive business practices.
Many reasons have been offered for the differences in the United States
and European philosophies of antitrust. They are probably more valid in
total than any one singly. The "peculiarly American political notions,"'
1 4
may proceed from a belief in the fundamental healthiness of self-policing
competitive marketplace. 115 Americans may have a deep-seated distrust of
any and all unchecked concentrated power wherever it occurs, in govern-
ment or business.", The United States simply may have been blessed with
the size, resources, consumer population and (perhaps most important) the
sunshine of history's smile to permit the country to afford a wasteful
luxury: a trade regulation system that strikes down restraints for potential
as well as actual effects.
European states may be too small geographically and economically to
make domestic competition a viable policy." 7 (Isn't a Belgian "monopoly"
subject to Common Market competition most analogous to a Rhode Island
"monopoly" subject to United States competition?) Europeans may be less
suspicious of concentrations in business, and more confident of govern-
ment's capacity to control possible abuses as they arise. 1 8 European
concern for the consumer may be greater, while United States regulation
may aim more at control of suppliers' practices on the theory that thereby
the consumer is automatically served at the same time the field of enter-
prise is kept open for new entries." 9
Regardless of the ultimate explanation, the point most germane to the
present discussion is that virtually all of the non-communist modern indus-
trial nations do have legislation regulating restrictive business practices for
the purpose of reaching a common objective: economic efficiency tempered
with socio-political values.
Another development, much more relevant in the present context than
the study of what European nations do individually, are the substantive
provisions of the Treaty of Rome.' 20 Articles 85 and 86 are closer to the
United States law than any of the European municipal legislation with the
possible exception of Germany's. The EEC law was directly inspired by
114Application of this term to the antitrust laws of the U.S. is in Jennings, supra, note 75
at 175.
15See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 1-2 (1955).
116See NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 421-22 (1962).
117 BLAKE & PITOFSKY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST LAW 56 (1967).
'
18See id., 56-57; CONTROL, 210-1I.
119 CONTROL, id.
1201d.. 3 19-20.
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the Sherman Antitrust Law and other United States legislation, 121 and it
begins by prohibiting restrictive practices as such, rather than merely the
harmful effects of such practices.1 22 The EEC law on competition is still in
the developing stage, but has thus far moved to positions remarkably close
to those of the United States laws on many issues.1 23 If and when the
EFTA nations or other countries were admitted to membership in the
Common Market, the degree of accord between the United States and the
European antitrust philosophies could be very high.
There is a most notable and relevant moral to be drawn from the EEC's
adoption of a group competitive policy when only one (West Germany) of
the six individual nations was even close to a similar domestic policy. This
fact erodes the argument that where individual states do not embrace a
policy domestically, neither will they honor an international expression of
it. The "substantial differences which exist in national policies and prac-
tices," rather than rendering an international agreement "neither satisfac-
tory nor effective," 124 may be largely irrelevant. In any case, disunity of
national legislation, substantial or de minimis, probably has much less
bearing on this issue than has been thought. Indeed, where we have unity
in restrictive business-practices legislation today, it has been as much
hindrance as help, as we shall see.
Inadequacy of National Answers
Mere similarities in national restrictive business-practice policies, or
even total uniformity, will not automatically bring international harmony to
controls. Ironically, the proliferation of municipal legislation almost cer-
tainly has complicated-rather than allayed-the problem. Almost all na-
tional statutes steadfastly ignore activities which have their effect outside
121See, e.g., GERVEN, PRINCIPES DU DROrI DES ENTENTES DE LA COMMUNAUTE ECONO-
MIQUE EUROP ENE 3-4 (1966); GRAUPNER, THE RULES OF COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 8-9 (1965). It seems clear that the goal of the drafters was to create
competition within the EEC. As one of them said afterwards, "It is ... no exaggeration to
state that economically, the Rome Treaty is basically a Treaty for more com-
petition .... [Competition] has been considered as one of the principal pillars on which our
building rests," Quoted in MACLACHLAN & SWANN, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EU-
ROPEAN COMMUNITY 7 1 (1967). For a more detailed discussion of the role of competition in
the Common Market, see id., 71-87.
122Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty provides an escape clause for benign restrictions,
which may prove to be interpreted in a manner similar to the "Rule of Reason" as expounded
in United States case law. See JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW (1967).123 0ne salient exception is the area of mergers, generally prohibited in the United States
when they create too powerful an entity. These may be allowed in the Common Market as a
means of creating firms capable of competing on an "equal footing" with the larger United
States firms. See Deringer, EEC Antitrust Laws and Industrial Property Rights-Latest
Developments, XIII ANTITRUST BULl.. 341, 353 (1968).124See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
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the national territory. In fact, many national laws-following the example
of the Webb-Pomerene Act-encourage export cartels to engage in prac-
tices and restraints which would be prohibited if their effects were domes-
tic. 1
25
By definition, every restrictive trade practice in international commerce
raises a potentially insoluble conflict in sovereignty: states may feel a duty
to defend their citizens against restraints imposed by foreigners which
affect, in a manner contrary to the legally-stated national policies, the trade
within their national territory. 126 On the other hand, the same sovereign
states may not relish the obverse idea, that the acts of their citizens within
their national boundaries should be subject to the constraints imposed by
another state's legislative will. 1 27 These are the two horns of a dilemma,
and the very definition of our problem is a situation with at least one state
on either side of the issue.
Since the Second World War the United States has been most aggressive
in pushing its judicial control over extraterritorial restraints which redound
upon the United States market.1 28 Under the well-known rule of the Alcoa
case, restrictive business practices can be held "unlawful, though made
abroad, if they were [both] intended to affect imports and did affect
them."' 29 The reach of American courts is of course limited by the con-
stitutional requirements for obtaining personal jurisdiction, and the prac-
tical problems of enforcement abroad. For many years, however, this
country was the only jurisdiction with strong legislation vigorously en-
forced. It could impose its judgments as a condition precedent to doing
business here, often against foreign firms to whom the American market
was sufficiently important to persuade them to comply with court orders
125See OECD, Restrictive Business Practices: Comparative Summary of Legislations
[sic] in Europe and North America 33-35 (1964).126See id., 109-113. This is in keeping with the classic territorial theory of jurisdiction.
See, e.g., the exposition by F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law,
IIl REC. DE COURS 9, 23-43, 100-108 (1964) van Hecke, Le Droit Antitrust: Aspects
Comparatifs et Internationaux, 106 REC. DE COURs 257, 302-328 (1962); Jennings, Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, XXIII BRIT. YRBK. OF INT'L
LAW 146, 148-52 (1957).127E.g., United States attempts at discovery and enjoinder of foreign business operations
under the antitrust laws of this country have engendered strong reactions from a number of
foreign governments and courts on various occasions. These are recounted in several places,
most recently summarized in Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in
United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 104-106 n. 18 (1967). This is again in
keeping with general theories of nonapplication of foreign public law. See, e.g., F.A. Mann,
supra, note 126, 127-58; van Hecke, supra, note 126, 329-39; Jennings, supra, note 126.12 85ee authority cited supra, note 75.
129 United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 148, F.2d 416, 444 (2 Cir., 1945). The
rule of Alcoa has never been endorsed specifically by the Supreme Court, but it has been
given additional credence by the more recent case of United States v. Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Centre, Inc., CCH Trade Cases, para. 70,600, p. 77,414 (1963).
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for the continued privilege of doing business within the United States
borders. 3 0
All of this does not mean that the unusual and exorbitant jurisdictional
claims pressed by the United States have escaped adverse comment. Both
foreign governments and legal scholars have manifested their chagrin and
dismay at the American practice, which stirs up a veritable hornets' nest of
international conflicts-of-laws issues. This has all led to a spate of writing
on the propriety of extraterritorial application, clarifications of the United
States position, defenses to it, the nature of restrictive business-practices
legislation (penal? administrative? "public economic"?), considerations of
comity and sovereignty as applied to it, and any number of equally inter-
esting questions growing out of the unique problems inherent in national
control of international restrictive business practices.', Despite the dis-
cussion, no useful solutions which would simultaneously vindicate and
reconcile the national laws have been forthcoming. The 1965 proposal of a
simple reciprocity convention before the Council of Europe, though in
keeping with a current trend favoring the use of such conventions general-
ly, 132 appears singularly miscast as a solution to the problem of inter-
national enforcement of national cartel law. The summary dismissal of the
proposal should have proved as much.' 3
3
Bilateral treaties, which have been fruitfully employed in the field of tax
law to coordinate national policies,' 3 4 also have been utilized for purposes
of agreement on anti-cartel provisions. These provisions have been
uniformly innocuous in substance 3 5 and have been ignored in practice.
130Other nations, neither so self-sufficient nor so attractive a market as the United States,
could not exercise such power over importing firms. See PROCEEDINGS, University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business, International Conference on Control of Restrictive Business
Practices 162 (1960).
3 See e.g., the bibliography appended to van Hecke, supra, note 126 at 351-54.
'
32The Council of Europe in particular has waged a vigorous campaign for the harmo-
nization of law through reciprocity conventions and other means. See Kriger, The Council of
Europe and the Unification of Private Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 127 (1968).
133See text accompanying note 85 supra.
1a4See, e.g., OECD, Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital 23-25
(1963);OECD, Draft Double Taxation Convention on Estates and Inheritances 21-24 (1966).
135Such provisions have appeared in treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation in
the form of the following clause;
The two parties agree that business practices which restrain competition, limit access
to markets or foster monopolistic control, and which are engaged in or made effective by
one or more private or public commercial enterprises or by combination, agreement or
other arrangement among such enterprises may have harmful effects upon commerce
between their respective territories. Accordingly, each Party agrees upon the request of
the other Party to consult with respect to any such practices and to take such measures as
it deems appropriate with a view to eliminating such harmful effects.
The clause appears in treaties now effective between the United States and Denmark,
art. VIII., TIAS 4797; Greece, art. XV.I, TIAS 3057; Ireland, art. XV, TIAS 2155; Italy,
art. XIII.3, TIAS 1965; Japan, art. XVIII.1, TIAS 2863; Korea, art. XVIII.1, TIAS 3947;
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Unlike the tax treaties, they have been utilized only in agreements to which
the United States was a party.
Thus far, then, we have no consensus on most of the problems in this
area, ranging from the basic definitional problem to where "international
cartel law" fits in the "existing categories of conflicts of laws"' 3 6 to the
more practical problem of how best to allay the conflicts engendered by
extraterritorial reach of national laws-through uniform national legisla-
tion, reciprocity conventions, and bilateral' treaty arrangements have all
been proposed or attempted. This is neither the time nor the place in which
to supply answers to these questions-if in fact such answers exist. It
seems to this author, however, that enough scholarship has been expended
on national answers to an international problem. The United States will
probably continue to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in this area, per-
haps joined by Germany and the Common Market Commission. But this
fact of life is in itself no solution, nor does it appear to lend itself to
satisfactory accomodation.
It seems appropriate at this point to put aside consideration of the
problem on the national level and move, as the ITO Charter did originally,
and some governments have more recently, to international or suprana-
tional criteria. In doing so, we may readily admit that the issues involved in
the extraterritorial application of national restrictive business-practices leg-
islation form a mind-bending area of the law which appears far from
resolved today despite extensive discussion of it in the recent past. Admit
that it is in sum an important problem which-in the interests of world
commerce-should be resolved at some point. But admit also that it is a
problem earthbound in the classical concepts of national sovereignty and
territorial frontiers, concepts which already may have lost much of their
currency vis-5,-vis international commerce and industry.13 7 Then abandon
this most diverting and interesting concern for what has proved an almost
Nicaragua, art. XVIII.I, TIAS 4024; Pakistan, art. XVIII.l, TIAS 4683; West Germany,
art. XVIII.l, TIAS 3593. Substantially the same provision is also included in treaties with
France and Israel. See France, art. XL TIAS 4625; Isreal, art. XVIII., TIAS 2948. Similar
provisions have been written into any number of loan agreements and other formal agree-
ments with the governments of other nations. See, e.g., Edwards, Regulation of Monopolistic
Cartelization, 14 OHIo ST. L. J. 252, 265-71 (1953). More recently, the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962 provided for cancellation of negotiated benefits where the recipient country "engages
in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of international cartels) or policies unjust-
ifiably restricting United States commerce .... P.L. 87-794. 87th Cong., H.R. 11970, Oct.
11, 1962, 72 Stat. 872, § 252(b) (2).
'
36Ficker, Remarks, in II CARTEL AND MONOPOLY IN MODERN LAW 973. 975 (1961);
and see authority cited supra, notes 126-127.
137E.g., Professor Ren6 David notes that businessmen have found means of avoiding
national law in their international business transactions by writing standard-form contracts
with arbitration clauses, thus assuring that disputes will not be decided in national courts
applying national law. David. Methods of Unification, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 13, 22-24 (1968).
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irresistibly attractive intellectual nuisance and turn to a more practical
approach: multilateral -supranational or international -solutions to the
problem, which ask not extraterritorial application of national law but
national application of international norms.
Objectives of Controls on International Cartels
It seems to this observer that discussions treating proposed programs of
control on international restrictive-business practices have not made ade-
quate distinctions between the objectives at issue. It is one objective to
work for the "nationalization of transnational legal relationships,"13 8 i.e.,
for the imposition of a single state's legal order upon legal relationships
which are connected with several, often many, different states. It is quite
another objective to work toward the possibility of international coopera-
tion for the purpose of reaching solutions which may not conform to the
national legislation of any or all of the participants. Failure of the latter
objective to serve the interests of the former has often been used to refute
efforts at the latter, a patent non sequitur. x39 Reaching the first objective is
neither necessary nor relevant to achieving the second.
Thus, the supranational competitive regime effective in the European
Economic Community supersedes national legislation-none of the Inner
Six has legislation which coincides perfectly with that of the Rome Treaty,
nor does the Rome Treaty defer to national legislation. It demonstrates the
feasibility of different rules employed by a given country for different
contexts. This general lesson should not be lost, even granted that Eu-
rope's Common Market depends upon a comprehensive socio-
politico-economic plan of integration for an especially homogeneous group
of nations, a far more ambitious scheme and a more limited membership
than might be necessary for the sole purpose of instigating controls of
international cartels.
Informal consultations between states are functioning with some success
already, a40 but do not conform to any standard procedure, nor do they
create precedents which might serve as guidelines for subsequent con-
138Ernst Steindorf's phrase, quoted in Wengler, The Significance of the Principle of
Equality in the Conflict of Laws, 28 L & CP 822, 844 (1963).139A good example are the arguments by Gilbert Montague in rebuttal to Sigmund
Timberg's defense of the ECOSOC Draft at the University of Michigan's Summer Institute in
1955. Compare Timberg, Restrictive Business Practices as an Appropriate Subject for United
Nations Action, with Montague, The Proposed UN Program on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices, in University of Michigan Summer Institute on International and Comparative Law,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONs 443, 485 (1955). The same sort of argu-
ment is set out in the Minority Report, and Montague's answer to it, in Report of the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 98-108 (1955).
-
4
°See notes 59, 69, and 94 supra.
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sultations. Neither do they generate information available generally to
other potentially interested governments. In short, if consultation functions
at present, there is no reason it should not be given some formal and
substantive basis and utilized to begin creating a uniform body of law and
practice in the field.
Further impetus to structured controls over international business re-
straints may come from international feelings, growing simultaneously with
international trade and popular awareness of the "shrinking-world" phe-
nomenon, analogous to the sort of "populist" sentiment against business
concentrations and market power which was a prelude to domestic enact-
ment of the Sherman Antitrust Law in 1890.141 Anti-American expressions
may be one manifestation of this feeling, since a high percentage of the
largest international concerns are either subsidiaries or branches of United
States firms or carry strong connotations of American big-business
influence.1 42 Many Europeans might be pleased at the creation of in-
stitutions which would permit official European interests to participate in
discussions concerned with the international conduct of the biggest United
States firms. Less developed countries of the "third world" might be
interested in anything which would provide them some potential means of
regulation against the international cartels that sell them imported goods
and the oligopsonies that buy their raw materials. 143 Perhaps to a lesser
degree, there may be a growing sense of the socio-political function of
trade regulation, its potential as a means of introducing non-economic
policy considerations in an area where private initiative is seldom con-
cerned with matters extraneous to economics.
Drawing upon current needs and past efforts, as discussed above, it
seems that the following are practical and valuable objectives for a multila-
teral scheme of controls over international restrictive business practices in
1969: (1) a statement of substantive law, (2) a formal complaint-processing
procedure, (3) discovery procedures, (4) official recommendations in spec-
ific cases, (5) a broad, yet relatively homogeneous group of participating
states, (6) mechanisms for change in the system.
These are the same objectives that have been discussed in most of the
multilateral proposals since that of William Oualid in 1926.144 Certainly
these were the issues in the ITO Charter's Chapter V and again in the
ECOSOC Draft of 1953. In varying degrees they have been present in all
141The author first came across this concept in the testimony of economist Stephen
Hymer of Yale before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Hearings,
International Aspects ofAntitrust, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. I at 23-24 (1966).1421d. at 206.143See note 61 supra and accompanying text.144See notes 4 and 5 supra and accompanying text.
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serious considerations since: in GATT, the ECSC and the EEC, the
EFTA and the OECD. Yet no system incorporating these elements exists
on the international scale of modern trade; and perhaps none is likely in the
foreseeable future. 145
The world is building up a backlog of international problems that chafe
at the old concepts of sovereignty and nation states: space law, fishing and
other economic operations on or in the high seas, mining or other activities
on and under the deep ocean floor, transportation, and communications, to
name a few of the more salient examples. To most of these problems
international solutions are the only practical ones and the question be-
comes: will the solution catch up with the problem in time? With this in
mind, a brief outline of a proposal is appended here for purposes of
demonstrating what might be feasible in logic if not in current fact.
Summary Thoughts on the Form and Substance of a Possible Multilateral
Scheme of Controls on International Restrictive Business Practices.
Substantive Law
The substantive law of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty of 1957
could serve as the basis for whatever final draft provisions were prepared.
The Treaty of Rome provisions might prove acceptable both to the United
States, whose law they are derived from, and to the European nations now
applying them or contemplating membership in the EEC, where they would
have to apply them in the future.
The substantive statement in the Rome Treaty is not remarkably
different from that contained in article 46 of the Havana Chapter in 1948,
but symbolically there may be value in turning to a fresher statement which
is proving itself workable on a supranational scale. For purposes of a
multilateral agreement, the EEC Treaty's § 85 (2) and use of the word
"prohibited" as applied to international cartel activities probably would
have to be dropped in favor of a more precatory term, such as the EFTA
Convention's "improper."' 146
Membership and Form
At a minimum, any agreement should try to include the members of the
OECD.147 These countries comprise the industrial powers of the western
world and thus include within their jurisdictions a large percentage of the
145Vernon, supra note 105.
146See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
147The OECD presently includes Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.
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producers and distributors likely to enter into international restrictive busi-
ness agreements or other practices. Other countries could be admitted
upon invitation or request, and hopefully the less developed nations would
recognize their interest in any proposal of this sort and participate. Since
the OECD has the problem under discussion now and all but three of its
members have affirmed the value of trade regulation by passing national
legislation, it might be possible to initiate the proposal before that group.
The real stumbling block to effective international controls is the
difficulty of instigating permanent institutions responsible for their appli-
cation. No better proposals exist than that placed before the ECOSOC in
1953: an assembly (annually or more frequently) of national representa-
tives, a standing board of independent experts selected by the assembly,
and a secretariat established in the same way. Reliance on, and coordina-
tion with, existing international agencies and offices could be maximized.
For example, the secretariat could function in cooperation with GATT,
UNCTAD, the OECD, or all three, depending upon participating states.
Information Gathering
All participating states could agree to full enforcement and cooperation
in discovery matters. 148 The board of independent experts, rather than any
foreign nation, could be charged with the collection and correlation of data.
The board could carry out general fact-finding functions at its own dis-
cretion, certified by the secretary, and specific investigations in connection
with any pending controversy, or upon the request of any state or private
individual.
For purposes of the control system, no public disclosure of the data
collected would be necessary. It could serve as a check in the manner of a
bank audit, permitting official action where improper practices were dis-
covered in specific instances, but even more important serving a vital
purpose in providing an overview of broader trends and potential problem
areas for drafting future policy. The board of experts could prepare an
annual report to the assembly presenting existing information in this way.
The annual report, including the particulars of any specific controversies
considered during the year, should be confidential-classified and circu-
148The collection of information is key to any effort in this area.The lack of current data
is crippling. As Professor Edwards recounts:
I went to one man who had written a memorandum between the wars as to the
character of cartels in Europe and asked him if there was any comparable statement
about cartels after World War 1i, and he said no. Then I said, "Can you give me your
impression? Is the situation as you described it between the wars any different now?" He
said, "There is one great difference. I can no longer find out." Senate Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee, Hearings, supra note 141 at 312-13.
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lated only internally-in all but exceptional circumstances as designated by
the assembly.
Formal Controversy Procedure and Official Recommendations
Consultations, agreed to by consent among the nations involved in an
alleged international restrictive business practice, could be a compulsory
first step in all cases. Although a private complaint would not compel
consultations, it could serve as sufficient cause for a fact-finding process by
the standing group of experts.
All participating states should agree that representatives of the board of
experts shall participate, with voice but no vote, in any and all con-
sultations between them regarding international restrictive business prac-
tices. The board of experts could then prepare a report on the issues and
decisions involved in each negotiation, relieving the states of doing so but
not preventing them from adding anything to the report which they felt was
pertinent.
Upon failure to resolve the controversy in consultation between states,
the issue could be taken before the international cartel authority on the
request of any state participant in the unsuccessful negotiation. The board
of experts could then consider the circumstances and draft a recommenda-
tion. Final consideration of the board's recommendation could take place
in the assembly, which could adopt the recommendation by majority vote.
In event of adoption, any such recommendation would not be binding upon
the states to which it was directed. 149
Provision for Future Change
It is anticipated that great changes will occur in International Law in the
near future. Provisions for modification could be included in the cartel
control scheme to keep it consistent with these changes. The board of
experts might propose such changes at any time, but could be required to
include an assessment and proposals for change in its annual report at least
every three years. At any time the assembly agreed to them, changes could
be proposed for formal ratification by member state governments.
149Sanctions are not absolutely necessary to a proper legal regime, particularly in inter-
national-trade matters. The GATT, the IMF, and the EEC should have demonstrated this.
Thus the Catalan canonist, San Ram6n of Pefiafort, long ago added a fifth func-
tion-recommending-to the classic maxim which is still too often limited to four:
Quatuor ex verbis virtutern collige legis: Permittit, punit, imperat atque vetat. (Under-
stand you the value of the law from these four words: permitting, punishing, commanding
and forbidding.)-cited in VAN KEFFENs, HISPANIc LAW 28 (1968).
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
Restrictive Business Practices
Conclusion
Discussion of legal controls on private restraints of international trade
has been misdirected in recent years, tending to concentrate on the nation-
al aspects of a problem which wants international solution. Almost unre-
marked, international organizations have instigated a system of con-
sultation among states to reach international agreement in specific cases.
EFTA has been the most advanced in this effort, although GATT and the
OECD have formally endorsed similar arrangements. The United States,
long the aggressor in the controversy over extraterritorial jurisdiction over
restraints, has also utilized consultations with other countries in lieu of
domestic judicial proceedings on several occasions.
It seems a propitious time to direct attention back to the possibility of
international institutions for the control of international restrictive business
practices, especially when one realizes that within the last few years
changes have taken place which bear closely on the problem. No radical
steps are proposed here, but simply a non-binding procedure which would
give more formality and substance to a current trend toward informal
consultation. Such a consolidation of present potential would not be an
ultimate solution, but merely a step forward on the way to an international
r6gime. It should provide experience and information that could serve us
well as we begin to move toward legal answers to the private issues raised
by global trade.
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